考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链平台合作决策

为探讨制造商与转销型以及与代销型平台的合作问题,应用制造商主导下的Stackelberg博弈模型针对零售商具有横向、纵向和双向3种公平关切情况的供应链进行决策分析。以算例形式比较不同公平关切系数对供应链成员定价及利润的影响情况,进一步讨论制造商的平台选择策略。研究表明,零售商公平关切倾向并不总是有利于提高自身的利润;从绝对利润来看,横向公平关切越大,对于与转销型平台合作的制造商更有利;纵向公平关切越大,制造商与代运营型平台合作更有利。从相对利润来看,高横向−低纵向公平关切下,制造商倾向于与转销型平台合作;低横向−高纵向公平关切下,制造商倾向于与代销型平台合作。     

P2P环境下支持版权交易的DRM模型

对等网络因其具有分布式、自组织、带宽利用率高等特点,在分布式文件分发、多媒体传输、网络流媒体服务方面有着广阔的应用前景,成为研究领域的一个热点。但是由于对等网络分布式的结构特点,必须引入版权保护机制对多媒体文件版权进行保护。文章提出了一种P2P环境下支持版权交易的DRM模型,为解决对等网络下的版权交易问题提出了一个可行的方案。     

考虑产品绿色度的制造商销售模式选择研究

针对电商平台销售渠道背景下制造商的销售模式选择问题,在一个绿色产品制造商和一个平台商组成的供应链中,考虑产品绿色度,运用Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同决策模型,研究制造商引入电商平台渠道的条件、最优销售模式和产品绿色度。研究发现：制造商不引入电商平台渠道,只通过自建网络直销渠道销售绿色产品时,产品绿色度最低;引入电商平台渠道可以激励制造商提升产品绿色度。代销模式下,产品绿色度最高,制造商的利润也最多;消费者对产品绿色度敏感程度的增强会促使制造商提升产品绿色度,但绿色投资成本的增加会降低制造商生产绿色产品的积极性。     

The point of purchase decision in a supply chain with value-added reselling

We explore a stylised decision model in order to better understand the trade-offs inherent in locating the point of purchase on a supply chain. In simple terms, a supply chain can be visualised as a series of value-adding production stages where the end product becomes increasingly differentiated as it travels downstream. The manufacturer is responsible for all processing up to the point of purchase, whereas the buyer (a value-added reseller) is responsible for further processing up to the end of product completion. Product demand becomes more and more uncertain with each downstream stage resulting in ever larger errors in matching demand with supply. Our paper proposes an approach and a model for finding the best location for the interface between the manufacturer and buyer so that the buyer’s expected total profit is maximised, and explores how product characteristics such as configurability and lead time sensitivity of demand might impact the results.     

Marketplace or reselling: the pricing decisions and face value of the coupons under the Cap-and-Trade regulation

This paper considers a manufacturer selling his products with the marketplace or the reselling mode under the cap-and-trade regulation. Coupons are allocated when selling the products. We explore the optimal decisions, the selection and the coordination with the two modes. First, we analytically find that the increase of the cap and platform power (commission rate) increases (decreases) the total production quantity and the optimal production quantity for coupon-sensitive consumers, and interestingly find that it reduces (increases) the production quantity for coupon-insensitive consumers when the sensitivity of the coupons is high. Furthermore, the optimal profit of the manufacturer first increases and then decreases with the cap when the emission intensity is low, and it increases with the cap when the emission intensity is high. Second, the marketplace mode creates more (less) profits for the manufacturer if the order-fulfillment cost is low (high). Whether the marketplace mode or the reselling mode will generate more carbon emission depends on the commission rate and the platform power. Finally, the marketplace mode is not capable of coordinating the manufacturer and the platform at all times, while the reselling mode can coordinate the two firms after considering a coupon-sharing contract under considerable platform power, and they can achieve Pareto improvement with a two-part tariff contract under the generalized Nash bargaining framework.