Developing architecture for upgrading I&C systems of an operating nuclear power plant using a quality attribute-driven design method |
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Authors: | Yong Suk Suh Jong Yong Keum Hyeon Soo Kim |
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Affiliation: | aSMART Technology Validation Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 150-1 Dukjin-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejon, Republic of Korea;bDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam Nat’l Univ., 220 Gung-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejon, Republic of Korea |
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Abstract: | This paper presents the architecture for upgrading the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of a Korean standard nuclear power plant (KSNP) as an operating nuclear power plant. This paper uses the analysis results of KSNP's I&C systems performed in a previous study. This paper proposes a Preparation–Decision–Design–Assessment (PDDA) process that focuses on quality oriented development, as a cyclical process to develop the architecture. The PDDA was motivated from the practice of architecture-based development used in software engineering fields. In the preparation step of the PDDA, the architecture of digital-based I&C systems was setup for an architectural goal. Single failure criterion and determinism were setup for architectural drivers. In the decision step, defense-in-depth, diversity, redundancy, and independence were determined as architectural tactics to satisfy the single failure criterion, and sequential execution was determined as a tactic to satisfy the determinism. After determining the tactics, the primitive digital-based I&C architecture was determined. In the design step, 17 systems were selected from the KSNP's I&C systems for the upgrade and functionally grouped based on the primitive architecture. The overall architecture was developed to show the deployment of the systems. The detailed architecture of the safety systems was developed by applying a 2-out-of-3 voting logic, and the detailed architecture of the non-safety systems was developed by hot-standby redundancy. While developing the detailed architecture, three ways of signal transmission were determined with proper rationales: hardwire, datalink, and network. In the assessment step, the required network performance, considering the worst-case of data transmission was calculated: the datalink was required by 120 kbps, the safety network by 5 Mbps, and the non-safety network by 60 Mbps. The architecture covered 17 systems out of 22 KSNP's I&C systems. The architecture is implementable with the equipment developed in South Korea. The architecture can be used as a model to upgrade the existing I&C systems in a planned, large-scale, and one-shot manner. A more detailed architecture down to software level will be developed in the future. |
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Keywords: | Abbreviations: 1E, electrical class 1E AAC D/G, alternate AC diesel generator BDAS, boron dilution alarm system BOP, balance of plant BOP RMS, BOP radiation monitoring system BP, bistable processor CCG, control channel gateway CEA, control element assembly CEAC, CEA calculator CEDM, control element drive mechanism CEDM CS, CEDM control system CEDM CS AC, CEDM CS auxiliary cabinet CEDM MGC, CEDM motor generator cabinet CET, core exit thermocouple CIM, component interface module CP, coincidence processor CPC, core protection calculator CPCS, core protection calculation system CPM, control panel multiplexer CPP, CEA position processor CS, confirm switch CWP, CEA withdrawal prohibit DCS, distributed control system DPS, diverse protection system ENFMS, ex-core neutron flux monitoring system ESFAS ARC, engineered safety feature actuation system auxiliary relay cabinet FIDAS, fixed in-core detector amplification system FPD, flat panel display FWCS, feedwater control system GC, group controller HJTC, heated junction thermocouple IC, initiation circuit ICCMS, inadequate core cooling monitoring system ICD, in-core detector ILS, interposing logic system Iso., isolator ITP, interface and test processor LC, loop controller LPMS, loose parts monitoring system MCB, main control board MCR, main control room MTP, maintenance and test panel N1E, electrical non-class 1E NCCS, non-safety component control system NCS, NSSS control system NIAN, non-safety indication and alarm network NIAS, non-safety indication and alarm system NIMS, NSSS integrity monitoring system NPIS, non-safety process instrumentation system NSSS PCC, NSSS process control cabinet NSSS PPC, NSSS process protective cabinet NSSS RMSC, NSSS radiation monitoring system cabinet NSSS, nuclear steam supply system OM, operator's module PAM, post-accident monitoring PAMI, post-accident monitoring and indication PAMS, post-accident monitoring system PAS AC, PAS auxiliary cabinet PAS, plant annunciator system PASC, PAS cabinet PAS CC, PAS computer cabinet PCS, plant computer system PDAS, plant data acquisition system PIS, process instrumentation system PLC, programmable logic controller PLCS, pressurizer level control system PMCN, plant monitoring and control network PMCS, plant monitoring and control system PPCS, pressurizer pressure control system PPCSC, PPCS cabinet PPS, plant protection system PZR CS, pressurizer control system RCP SSSS, RCP shaft speed sensing system RMS, radiation monitoring system RPCS, reactor power cutback system RRS, reactor regulating system RSP, remote shutdown panel RSPT, reed switch position transmitter RSR, remote shutdown room RTSS, reactor trip switchgear system SBCS, steam bypass control system SCCS, safety component control system SCN, safety control network SDL, safety datalink SIN, safety information network SIAS, safety indication and alarm system SICN, safety inter-channel network SMS, seismic monitoring system SOES, sequence of events system SPIS, safety process instrumentation system TCB, trip circuit breaker TCS, turbine control system VMS, vibration monitoring system |
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