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Developing architecture for upgrading I&C systems of an operating nuclear power plant using a quality attribute-driven design method
Authors:Yong Suk Suh  Jong Yong Keum  Hyeon Soo Kim
Affiliation:aSMART Technology Validation Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 150-1 Dukjin-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejon, Republic of Korea;bDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam Nat’l Univ., 220 Gung-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejon, Republic of Korea
Abstract:This paper presents the architecture for upgrading the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of a Korean standard nuclear power plant (KSNP) as an operating nuclear power plant. This paper uses the analysis results of KSNP's I&C systems performed in a previous study. This paper proposes a Preparation–Decision–Design–Assessment (PDDA) process that focuses on quality oriented development, as a cyclical process to develop the architecture. The PDDA was motivated from the practice of architecture-based development used in software engineering fields. In the preparation step of the PDDA, the architecture of digital-based I&C systems was setup for an architectural goal. Single failure criterion and determinism were setup for architectural drivers. In the decision step, defense-in-depth, diversity, redundancy, and independence were determined as architectural tactics to satisfy the single failure criterion, and sequential execution was determined as a tactic to satisfy the determinism. After determining the tactics, the primitive digital-based I&C architecture was determined. In the design step, 17 systems were selected from the KSNP's I&C systems for the upgrade and functionally grouped based on the primitive architecture. The overall architecture was developed to show the deployment of the systems. The detailed architecture of the safety systems was developed by applying a 2-out-of-3 voting logic, and the detailed architecture of the non-safety systems was developed by hot-standby redundancy. While developing the detailed architecture, three ways of signal transmission were determined with proper rationales: hardwire, datalink, and network. In the assessment step, the required network performance, considering the worst-case of data transmission was calculated: the datalink was required by 120 kbps, the safety network by 5 Mbps, and the non-safety network by 60 Mbps. The architecture covered 17 systems out of 22 KSNP's I&C systems. The architecture is implementable with the equipment developed in South Korea. The architecture can be used as a model to upgrade the existing I&C systems in a planned, large-scale, and one-shot manner. A more detailed architecture down to software level will be developed in the future.
Keywords:Abbreviations: 1E, electrical class 1E   AAC D/G, alternate AC diesel generator   BDAS, boron dilution alarm system   BOP, balance of plant   BOP RMS, BOP radiation monitoring system   BP, bistable processor   CCG, control channel gateway   CEA, control element assembly   CEAC, CEA calculator   CEDM, control element drive mechanism   CEDM CS, CEDM control system   CEDM CS AC, CEDM CS auxiliary cabinet   CEDM MGC, CEDM motor generator cabinet   CET, core exit thermocouple   CIM, component interface module   CP, coincidence processor   CPC, core protection calculator   CPCS, core protection calculation system   CPM, control panel multiplexer   CPP, CEA position processor   CS, confirm switch   CWP, CEA withdrawal prohibit   DCS, distributed control system   DPS, diverse protection system   ENFMS, ex-core neutron flux monitoring system   ESFAS ARC, engineered safety feature actuation system auxiliary relay cabinet   FIDAS, fixed in-core detector amplification system   FPD, flat panel display   FWCS, feedwater control system   GC, group controller   HJTC, heated junction thermocouple   IC, initiation circuit   ICCMS, inadequate core cooling monitoring system   ICD, in-core detector   ILS, interposing logic system   Iso., isolator   ITP, interface and test processor   LC, loop controller   LPMS, loose parts monitoring system   MCB, main control board   MCR, main control room   MTP, maintenance and test panel   N1E, electrical non-class 1E   NCCS, non-safety component control system   NCS, NSSS control system   NIAN, non-safety indication and alarm network   NIAS, non-safety indication and alarm system   NIMS, NSSS integrity monitoring system   NPIS, non-safety process instrumentation system   NSSS PCC, NSSS process control cabinet   NSSS PPC, NSSS process protective cabinet   NSSS RMSC, NSSS radiation monitoring system cabinet   NSSS, nuclear steam supply system   OM, operator's module   PAM, post-accident monitoring   PAMI, post-accident monitoring and indication   PAMS, post-accident monitoring system   PAS AC, PAS auxiliary cabinet   PAS, plant annunciator system   PASC, PAS cabinet   PAS CC, PAS computer cabinet   PCS, plant computer system   PDAS, plant data acquisition system   PIS, process instrumentation system   PLC, programmable logic controller   PLCS, pressurizer level control system   PMCN, plant monitoring and control network   PMCS, plant monitoring and control system   PPCS, pressurizer pressure control system   PPCSC, PPCS cabinet   PPS, plant protection system   PZR CS, pressurizer control system   RCP SSSS, RCP shaft speed sensing system   RMS, radiation monitoring system   RPCS, reactor power cutback system   RRS, reactor regulating system   RSP, remote shutdown panel   RSPT, reed switch position transmitter   RSR, remote shutdown room   RTSS, reactor trip switchgear system   SBCS, steam bypass control system   SCCS, safety component control system   SCN, safety control network   SDL, safety datalink   SIN, safety information network   SIAS, safety indication and alarm system   SICN, safety inter-channel network   SMS, seismic monitoring system   SOES, sequence of events system   SPIS, safety process instrumentation system   TCB, trip circuit breaker   TCS, turbine control system   VMS, vibration monitoring system
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