电力市场下区域与省电网公司管理机制设计

针对未来区域电力市场的管理结构模式和我国电网当前所面临的网架结构薄弱和机组装机容量状况,运用委托-代理理论对未来区域电网公司与所属省电网公司的管理模式与激励机制进行了模型设计,分析表明在对称信息条件下当委托人是风险中性,而代理人是风险规避型时,该模型能够达到帕累托最优风险分担和帕累托最优努力水平,电网公司可以在保证整个电网运营的安全性和稳定性的同时实现电网公司的利润最大化.

The Incentive Mechanism Design between Regional and Provincial Electric Power Companies

The reform of electric power system in China has made great strides, and now regional electric power market is in experiment. According to the managerial structure pattern of the future regional electric power market and the conditions of the present electric power network in our country such as the weakness of the lattice framed structure and the installed capacity of generating sets of hydroelectric power station, this paper designed the incentive mechanism and management model between future regional and provincial electric power network companies using the principal-agent theory. The analysis illustrates that under the condition of symmetric information when the risk of the principal is risk-neutral and that of the agent is risk-averse, this model will achieve Pareto optimal allocation of risks and Pareto optimal level of effort. The electric power network companies can realize the profit maximization as well as the safeness and stability of the operation of the whole electric power network.