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Foundations for a model of knowing: II. Fallible but functional knowledge.
Authors:Agnew, Neil M.   Brown, John L.
Abstract:
Argues that an evolving theory known as "constructivism" challenges the traditional view of how individuals generate and revise knowledge. Constructivism helps address a major issue raised by modern scholars of the history and philosophy of science and decision theory. The question relates to how to reduce the search and solution space of complex and changing environments to "mind size" (i.e., to fit person's limited memory and computational capacity). One emerging answer is that individuals rely heavily on robust presuppositions and simplified representations of environmental structure. Two issues are addressed: Under what conditions knowledge can be highly fallible and at the same time be highly functional and whether one can make a plausible case, within this constructivist frame of reference, for realism, for knowledge that approximates "reality." (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords:
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