| 工程计价方式"双轨制"下的寻租博弈行为分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 许强,项勇.工程计价方式"双轨制"下的寻租博弈行为分析[J].西华大学学报(自然科学版),2006,25(2):64-65,69. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 许强 项勇 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400045
2. 西华大学建筑与土木学院,四川,成都,610039 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 由于渐进式改革形成的工程计价方式“双轨制”及市场的不完善性和无序性,为寻租行为的产生提供了环境。本文作者通过建立投资方、项目执行者、承包方三方之问的寻租博弈模型,求解混合策略纳什均衡解,根据均衡解分析在不同条件下三方的最优策略,并提出了防止寻租行为的对策。
|
| 关 键 词： | 工程计价方式 双轨制 寻租博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-159X（2006）02-0064-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-06-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-06-082005-12-10 |
Analysis of Rent-Seek Game Behavior in Project Valuation Way "Dual Track System" |
| |
| XU Qiang,XIANG Yong.Analysis of Rent-Seek Game Behavior in Project Valuation Way "Dual Track System"[J].Journal of Xihua University:Natural Science Edition,2006,25(2):64-65,69. |
| |
| Authors: | XU Qiang XIANG Yong |
| |
| Affiliation: | Faculty of Construction Management and Real Estate of Chongqing University |
| |
| Abstract: | Because evolutionary reformation formed project valuation way "dual track system" and the market was unperfect and unordered,the environment for producing rent-seeking behavior was offered.Through setting up the rent-seeking game model among investor,project executor,and contractor,this paper drew a conclusion of mix tactic Nashon-equilibrium.Then according to Nashon-equilibrium conclusion,it analyzed the optimum tactics of three sides under different conditions and proposed the measure of controlling rent-seeking behavior. |
| |
| Keywords: | project valuation way dual track system rent-seeking game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
