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基于综合需求响应和奖惩阶梯碳交易的能源枢纽 主从博弈优化调度
引用本文:王 瑞,程 杉,刘 烨,徐建宇,李 敏.基于综合需求响应和奖惩阶梯碳交易的能源枢纽 主从博弈优化调度[J].电力系统保护与控制,2022,50(8):76-86.
作者姓名:王 瑞  程 杉  刘 烨  徐建宇  李 敏
作者单位:智慧能源技术湖北省工程研究中心(三峡大学),湖北 宜昌 443002,国网河南省电力公司驻马店供电公司,河南 驻马店 463000
基金项目:三峡大学硕士学位论文培优基金;国家自然科学基金
摘    要:为了充分考虑综合能源系统的低碳性以及多能负荷响应特性的复杂性,提出了考虑综合需求响应和奖惩阶梯型碳交易机制的能源枢纽(Energy Hub, EH)主从博弈优化调度策略。首先,为有效评估多能负荷柔性特性和响应能力,将建筑热传递模型与生活热水储存模型集成到楼宇EH模型中,构建了考虑多种热量扰动因素的精细化综合需求响应模型。其次,考虑到供需双方的绿色调节能力,构建了奖惩阶梯型碳交易成本模型。并基于Stackelberg博弈理论,建立了能源枢纽运营商和用户的低碳优化模型。最后,提出了结合CPLEX工具箱的差分进化算法对所提模型进行求解。算例仿真验证了所提方法能够有效限制系统的碳排放量,充分发挥了需求侧资源的响应能力和减排潜力,实现了EH经济性和环保性的双赢。

关 键 词:能源枢纽  奖惩阶梯型碳交易  综合需求响应  Stackelberg博弈  柔性特性
收稿时间:2021/7/9 0:00:00
修稿时间:2021/10/8 0:00:00

Master-slave game optimal scheduling of energy hub based on integrated demand response and a reward and punishment ladder carbon trading mechanism
WANG Rui,CHENG Shan,LIU Ye,XU Jianyu,LI Min.Master-slave game optimal scheduling of energy hub based on integrated demand response and a reward and punishment ladder carbon trading mechanism[J].Power System Protection and Control,2022,50(8):76-86.
Authors:WANG Rui  CHENG Shan  LIU Ye  XU Jianyu  LI Min
Affiliation:1. Engineering Center for Intelligent Energy Technology (China Three Gorges University), Yichang 443002, China; 2. Zhumadian Power Supply Company, State Grid Henan Electric Power Company, Zhumadian 463000, China
Abstract:To fully consider the low-carbon nature of an integrated energy system and the complex response characteristics of multi energy load, an energy hub (EH) master-slave game optimal scheduling strategy considering the integrated demand response and reward and punishment ladder carbon trading mechanism is proposed. First, to effectively evaluate the flexible characteristics and response capacity of multi energy load, a building heat transfer model and domestic hot water storage model are integrated into the building EH model. Then a refined integrated demand response model considering various heat disturbance factors is constructed. Secondly, considering the green regulation ability of the supply and demand sides, this paper constructs a reward and punishment ladder carbon transaction cost model. A master-slave game low-carbon optimization model for energy hub operators and users is established based on Stackelberg game theory. Finally, a differential evolution algorithm combined with a CPLEX toolbox is proposed to analyse the proposed model. The simulation results show that the proposed method can effectively limit the carbon emission of the system, give full play to the response ability and emission reduction potential of demand side resources, and realize a win-win of EH economy and environmental protection. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51607105).
Keywords:energy hub  reward and punishment ladder carbon trading  integrated demand response  Stackelberg game  flexibility characteristics
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