| 多任务委托代理关系的闭环供应链激励机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 关启亮,周根贵,曹柬.多任务委托代理关系的闭环供应链激励机制[J].工业工程,2009,12(4):23-27. |
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| 作者姓名： | 关启亮 周根贵 曹柬 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江工业大学,经贸管理学院,浙江,杭州,310023 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目，国家自然科学基金资助项目，浙江省软科学研究资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在多任务委托代理关系的闭环供应链中,制造商为委托人,而零售商为代理人.零售商的任务有二:销售制造商的产品以及从顾客中收集其废旧产品.通过比较非对称和对称信息下的线性激励合同,分析了不同参数对激励系数、制造商的决策,以及制造商的期望收入的影响.同时也分析了市场不确定性和风险规避因子对制造商赢利的影响.
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| 关 键 词： | 闭环供应链 委托代理 激励机制 |
On the Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Task Principal-Agent Closed-Loop Supply Chain |
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| Guan Qi-liang,Zhou Gen-gui,Cao Jian.On the Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Task Principal-Agent Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2009,12(4):23-27. |
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| Authors: | Guan Qi-liang Zhou Gen-gui Cao Jian |
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| Affiliation: | Guan Qi-liang,Zhou Gen-gui,Cao Jian(College of Business and Management,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou 310023,China) |
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| Abstract: | In a multi-task principal-agent closed-loop supply chain,the manufacturer acts as a principal and the retailer as agent.The retailer has two tasks: sell the manufacturer's products and recycle the waste products from the customers.By comparing the linear incentive contract under symmetric information with that under asymmetric information,we analyze the effect of different parameters on the incentive coefficient,manufacturer's decision-making,and the expected income of the manufacturer.We also analyze the e... |
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| Keywords: | closed-loop supply chain principal-agent incentive mechanism |
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