Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core |
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Authors: | Mojtaba Sadegh Reza Kerachian |
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Affiliation: | 1.Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Henry Samuely School of Engineering,University of California,Irvine,USA;2.School of Civil Engineering and Center of Excellence for Engineering and Management of Civil Infrastructures, College of Engineering,University of Tehran,Tehran,Iran |
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Abstract: | In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are
developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river
basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely
Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed
solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value
in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model
is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates
of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net
benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some
traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical
example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran. |
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