“双碳”目标下绿色建筑质量监管策略研究

为解决绿色建筑推广过程中的寻租现象，提高绿色建筑质量，基于政府监管部门、第三方检测机构、绿色建筑开发商，构建了绿色建筑质量监管博弈模型，分析了各参数对绿色建筑质量的影响关系并用动态奖惩机制进一步优化了该模型。结果表明:对开发商的监管是绿色建筑质量监管的关键；增量成本、增量风险与绿色建筑质量呈负相关，而增量收益、寻租成本、政府奖惩与绿色建筑质量呈正相关；动态奖惩机制对绿色建筑质量的提高有一定的促进作用。并为提高绿色建筑质量提出了一些政策建议。

Research on Green Building Quality Supervision StrategyUnder the "Double Carbon" Goal

This paper aims to solve the rent-seeking phenomenon in the process of green building promotion and improve thequality of green buildings. From the perspectives of government regulatory departments， third-party testing agencies， and greenbuilding developers， a green building quality supervision game model is constructed. The interactions among various parameters onthe quality of green buildings is analyzed. Then, the model is further optimized with a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism.The results show that (1) the supervision of developers is the key to the quality supervision of green buildings. (2) Incremental costsand incremental risks were negatively correlated with green building quality. However, incremental benefits， rent-seeking costs，government rewards, and penalties were positively correlated with green building quality. (3) The dynamic reward and punishmentmechanism may contribute to the improvement of green building quality. Finally， a number of policy recommendations were made toimprove the quality of green buildings.