一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议的安全性分析

2010年，Mohammad等人提出了一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议(MOHAMMAD Z, CHEN Y, HSU C, et al. Cryptanalysis and enhancement of two-pass authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocols. IETE Technical Review, 2010,27(3):252-65)。新协议以较高的运算效率实现了参与者双方的身份认证和密钥协商。对该协议的单轮版本进行了安全性分析，通过模拟协议中某些信息丢失后协议双方的通信过程，发现如果协议中的一些秘密信息丢失，敌手可以发起信息泄露伪装攻击、密钥泄露伪装攻击和一般定义下的伪装攻击，也无法抵抗中间人攻击。这些攻击都可以使得敌手冒充合法参与者发起或回应会话。

Analysis and improvement on a new three-party password-based authenticated key agreement protocol

In 2010, Z. Mohammad proposed a new two-party authenticated key agreement protocol (MOHAMMAD Z, CHEN Y, HSU C, et al. Cryptanalysis and enhancement of two-pass authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocols. IETE Technical Review, 2010,27(3):252-65). This protocol realizes the key agreement with higher computation efficiency. However, the one-round version of this protocol cannot resist on the loss of information impersonation attack, key compromise impersonation attack and general impersonation attack, this protocol is also vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack if some security information is lost. These security problems allow the adversary can initiate or reply the protocol with legal participants.