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A Practical Attack on KeeLoq |
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| Authors: | Wim Aerts Eli Biham Dieter De Moitié Elke De Mulder Orr Dunkelman Sebastiaan Indesteege Nathan Keller Bart Preneel Guy A. E. Vandenbosch Ingrid Verbauwhede |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Electrical Engineering ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Heverlee, Belgium 2. Interdisciplinary Institute for BroadBand Technology (IBBT), Ghent, Belgium 3. Department of Electrical Engineering ESAT/TELEMIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Heverlee, Belgium 4. Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, 32000, Israel 5. Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Weizmann Institute of Science, P.O. Box 26, Rehovot, 76100, Israel |
| Abstract: | KeeLoq is a lightweight block cipher with a 32-bit block size and a 64-bit key. Despite its short key size, it is used in remote keyless entry systems and other wireless authentication applications. For example, there are indications that authentication protocols based on KeeLoq are used, or were used by various car manufacturers in anti-theft mechanisms. This paper presents a practical key recovery attack against KeeLoq that requires 216 known plaintexts and has a time complexity of 244.5 KeeLoq encryptions. It is based on the principle of slide attacks and a novel approach to meet-in-the-middle attacks. |
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