| 公立高校的委托代理博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李晓明,刘波.公立高校的委托代理博弈分析[J].西安工业大学学报,2007,27(6):599-602. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李晓明 刘波 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北工业大学经济研究中心 西安710072(李晓明)，西安交通大学公共政策与管理学院 西安710049(刘波) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从非营利组织的视角,重点探讨公立高校在委托代理中的风险分担和激励问题以期提升其运行效率.首先分析了代理风险的表现形式,接着剖析了代理风险的产生原因,然后重点就委托人与代理人之间的博弈关系建立了相应的博弈模型,分析了模型的含义并求解.在公立高校的运行中,委托人和代理人在不同的风险偏好状态下,风险分担的方式也不同.公立高校要提升运行效率,宜针对委托代理中的风险产生的原因和委托人、代理人的风险偏好特性而采取科学的监督管理方法.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 代理风险 非营利组织 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-9965（2007）06-599-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-10-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年10月10 |
The Analysis of Agency-principal Model in Universities as Non-profit Organizations Based on Game Theory |
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| Authors: | LI Xiao-ming LIU Bo |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,the agency risk and stimulating problems in public high schools as non-profit organizations were analyzed in detail for promoting its efficiency.Firstly,the forms of agency risk were analyzed.Secondly,the causes of agency risk were studied.Then the game model between agent and principal was set and the probable results were analyzed.During the operating procedure of higher schools,the manners in which the agencies and clients take risk could vary along with their different risk preferences.to improve the operating efficiency,higher schools should take reasonable stimulating and managing methods according to the reasons of agency risks and the agencies' and clients' different risk preferences. |
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| Keywords: | agency-principal agency risk non-profit organization game theory |
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