| 基于博弈论的流域水污染治理约束优化模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 张阳,黄德春,汤云超,汪群.基于博弈论的流域水污染治理约束优化模型[J].水利水电科技进展,2009,29(3):68-72. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张阳 黄德春 汤云超 汪群 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学商学院,江苏,南京,210098 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金，河海大学人文社会科学基金，河海大学社会科学基金，教育部人文社会科学研究基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 从水污染治理监管主体和客体之间的机会利益角度出发,建立博弈双方的优化模型,以松花江流域水污染治理实践验证该模型,验证结果表明可以通过加大对排污企业的收费,加大查处概率和惩罚强度等手段来实现博弈均衡下的帕累托改进。
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| 关 键 词： | 水污染治理 约束机制 机会利益 博弈论 |
| 修稿时间： | 2009/6/18 0:00:00 |
Constrained optimization model of river basin water pollution control based on game theory |
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| ZHANG Yang,HUANG De-chun,TANG Yun-chao,WANG Qun.Constrained optimization model of river basin water pollution control based on game theory[J].Advances in Science and Technology of Water Resources,2009,29(3):68-72. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Yang HUANG De-chun TANG Yun-chao WANG Qun |
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| Abstract: | From the perspective of opportunity benefits of the subject and object of water pollution control supervision,an optimization model for the two sides in the game is established.The model is verified by the water pollution control experience of the Songhua River Basin.The results show that Pareto improvement can be achieved in the condition of game equilibrium through higher fees of pollution emission firms and increasing the intensity and rate of punishment. |
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| Keywords: | water pollution control restriction mechanism opportunity benefit game theory |
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