不完全信息下PPP 项目特许期与资本结构决策研究

政府、社会资本和金融机构在特许期与资本结构上存在利益冲突，如何决策这两项重要参数以满足三方利益诉求是科技孵化器PPP 项目成功的关键。针对不完全信息条件下参与方地位不对称的PPP 项目特许期与资本结构决策研究，在PPP项目财务模型基础上，构建了基于项目净现值划分的讨价还价博弈模型，根据博弈结果及三方对特许期与股权水平的基本要求，得到满足三方要求的最优特许期与资本结构，分析了信息掌握程度及地位不对称程度对最优解的影响，并通过案例验证了模型的有效性。

Research on the Concession Period and Capital Structure Decision-making of PPP Projects Under Incomplete Information Conditions

Typically, conflicts of interest among government，social capital，and financial institutions emerges during the concessionperiod and capital structure decision-making process. How to decide these two important parameters to meet the competing interestsof the three parties is the key to the success of PPP projects of technology business incubator. Based on the financial model of PPP ，this paper constructs a bargaining game model based on the net present value of projects. According to the game analyses and thebasic requirements of the three parties regarding the concession period and equity level，the optimal concession period and capitalstructure are obtained. Then, the influence of the degree of information mastery and the degree of status asymmetry on the optimalsolution are analyzed. Finally，a case study is conducted to verify the effectiveness of the model.