技术能力水平对IT研发项目外包契约的影响

从企业和研发公司技术能力水平的角度出发，分析双方的技术能力及相应的技术融合风险对制定IT研发外包激励契约的影响。针对信息对称和不对称两种情形，构建基于委托代理的激励模型，通过模型结论分析了技术能力水平对企业收益的影响。结果表明，在信息对称下，研发公司的技术能力水平越高，则研发公司会越努力，企业的技术能力不会影响研发公司的努力水平，此时企业的收益随双方的技术能力水平先增后减；在信息不对称下，企业的技术能力水平越高，研发公司越不愿意努力，而企业的激励程度与双方的技术能力水平成反比，此时企业的期望收益与双方的技术能力水平关系并不明确。

The Influence of Technical Ability on Benefits Incentive Contract for IT R&D Outsourcing Project

From the perspective of technological capability, an analysis is conducted on the influence of the technical ability of both the enterprise and the R&D company and the corresponding technology integration risk to the development of IT outsourcing incentive contract. Aiming at both information symmetry and asymmetry, an incentive model is constructed based on the principal agent, and through the model, the influence of technical ability on the enterprise income is analyzed. The results show that, under information symmetry, the higher the technical capacity of the R&D company is, the more effort it will make. The ability of the enterprise will not affect the R&D company′s effort level. Enterprise earnings will increase with the technical ability of both sides, but when reaching the threshold, it will reduce. Under information asymmetry, the higher the technical ability of the enterprise is, the more reluctant the R&D company is to make effort. Enterprise′s incentive degree is inversely proportional to the technical ability of both sides, and the relationship between technical ability of both sides and enterprise earnings is not clear.