Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract |
| |
| Authors: | Yumei Hou Fangfang Wei Susan X. Li Allan Ashley |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. College of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, China;2. Department of Decision Sciences and Marketing, Robert B. Willumstad School of Business, Adelphi University, New York, NY, US;3. Department of Decision Sciences and Marketing, Robert B. Willumstad School of Business, Adelphi University, New York, NY, US |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper. |
| |
| Keywords: | supply chain management game theory three-echelon supply chain revenue sharing contract leader–follower game |
|
|
