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经销商公平偏好的供应链合作广告策略研究
引用本文:田永杰.经销商公平偏好的供应链合作广告策略研究[J].工业工程,2021,24(4):67-75.
作者姓名:田永杰
作者单位:郑州西亚斯学院 商学院,河南 新郑 451150
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重大项目资助(14ZDA072);河南省民办高校品牌专业建设项目资助(教政法〔2017〕344号)
摘    要:为研究经销商公平偏好对供应链合作广告策略的影响,构建由一个制造商和两个经销商构成的二级供应链合作广告多代理模型。运用委托代理理论分析信息不对称下经销商公平中性和公平偏好2种情形的合作广告策略,并运用数值方法分析均衡解。研究发现,经销商公平偏好时,广告投资努力、批发价格、广告补贴和制造商收益皆高于经销商公平中性时的相应水平,且均随经销商公平偏好程度的增强而提高。随着经销商公平偏好程度的增强,制造商降低了经销商的总利润分成,提高了广告补贴;制造商对经销商的激励方式更倾向固定广告补贴而不是与供应链总利润相关的利润分成。同时分析了广告弹性在合作广告策略中的影响。

关 键 词:信息不对称  公平偏好  合作广告  多代理模型
收稿时间:2020-03-15

A Research on Cooperative Advertising Strategy in Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference of the Distributors
TIAN Yongjie.A Research on Cooperative Advertising Strategy in Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference of the Distributors[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2021,24(4):67-75.
Authors:TIAN Yongjie
Affiliation:1. School of Business, Sias University, Xinzheng 451150, China;2. School of Economics, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
Abstract:In order to study the influence of the distributor's fairness preference on the cooperative advertising strategy in supply chain, a two-level supply chain cooperative advertising multi-agent model consisting of one manufacturer and two distributors is constructed. Using principal-agent theory, the cooperative advertising strategy is analyzed in the two situations of distributors fairness neutral and fairness preference under information asymmetry, and the equilibrium solution analyzed by numerical method. The results show that: when distributors have fairness preference, the advertising investment effort, the wholesale price, the advertising subsidy and the manufacturer's income are all higher than those of the corresponding level when the distributors are fairness neutral. The advertising investment effort, wholesale price, advertising subsidy and manufacturer's income increase with the increase of the degree of distributors' fairness preference. With the increase of distributors' fairness preference degree, the manufacturer reduces the total profit share of the distributors and increases the advertising subsidy of the distributors; Manufacturers' incentives to distributors are more likely to fix advertising subsidies than sharing profit related to the total profits of the supply chain. The influence of advertising flexibility in cooperative advertising strategy is also analyzed.
Keywords:asymmetric information  fairness preference  cooperative advertising  multi-agent model  
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