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| 上市高管持股与公司业绩的关系研究 | |
| 引用本文： | 熊小红. 上市高管持股与公司业绩的关系研究[J]. 湖南工业职业技术学院学报, 2013, 0(5): 40-41,29 |
| 作者姓名： | 熊小红 |
| 作者单位： | 湖南邮电职业技术学院,湖南长沙410015 |
| 摘 要： | 所有权与经营权的分离产生了委托代理问题，进而引发信息不对称的问题。在现代企业中，良好的公司治理机制能有效地降低委托代理成本。本文从委托代理理论和信息不对称理论出发，分析了高管持股比例与公司业绩的关系，并对股权激励在公司治理中的应用提出了建议。 |
| 关 键 词： | 高管持股 公司业绩 现状 应用 |
Research on Relation Between Shareholding of Executives and Listed Company Performance |
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| Affiliation: | XIONG Xian-hong (Hunan Post and Telecommunication College, Changsha 410015, Hunan) |
| Abstract: | The separation of ownership and managerial authority produced a principal-agent problem, triggering a problem of asymmetric information. In modern enterprises, good corporate governance mechanism can ef ectively reduce agency costs. From the principal-agent theory and the theory of asymmetric information, this article analyzes the relation between the shareholding ratio of senior executives and the company performance, and proposes suggestions to application of stock ownership incentive in corporate governance. |
| Keywords: | executive shareholding company performance current situation Application |
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