| Abstract: | Proposes a particular ground for moral formulation that is consistent with the consensually based scientific ethic. Researchers' acts of formulating investigatory designs constitute moral values, but these assumptions of value often go unnoticed because they violate the positivist mandate that science should be value neutral. Only a special kind of consensus is "scientific" (as opposed to ideological) because the scientific ethic accepts knowledge as truthful only when it is openly achieved after evenhanded consideration and tested in debate. Since truth in science is a moral issue, close examination should be made of science's moral grounds. The kinds of analyses typically performed by philosophers are an essential part of this empirical search. The author concludes that moral research cannot be "scientific" if this means being value neutral, but it can be scientific in the sense of impartially submitting all formulations to the full reality of people's moral consensuses and interactions in everyday life. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
