基于演化博弈论的PPP项目再谈判策略分析

PPP 项目周期长和可变因素多等原因导致后期存在较多争议项需要进行再谈判，为解决 PPP 项目再谈判策略选择问题，以 PPP 项目的两个主要参与方即政府方和社会资本方为博弈主体。综合考虑再谈判可能发生的利益、风险以及再谈判结果的社会影响等因素，运用演化博弈理论，建立二者动态博弈的适应度函数并求解复制动态方程，分析模型主要参数与再谈判演化稳定策略的关系，得出影响双方选择强硬或妥协策略的关键参数，并据此深入了解 PPP 项目的特性，提出有效的再谈判诉求，完善再谈判的解决机制等建议，为促进 PPP 项目再谈判有效进行和 PPP 项目整体顺利推进提供了理论依据。

Analysis of PPP Project Renegotiation StrategyBased on Evolutionary Game Theory

Due to the long duration and various variables in PPP project，many disputed items need to be renegotiated in the laterstage. To solve the strategy selection problem of PPP project renegotiation，two main participants of the PPP project, namely thegovernment party and the social capital party，are taken as game-agent. Considering factors such as the possible benefits, risks, andthe social impact of renegotiation，this paper employs the evolutionary game theory to build the fitness function of the dynamicgames and solve the replication dynamic equation. Then the paper analyzes the relationship between the main parameters and therenegotiation evolution strategy，indentifying key parameters that influence players’ tough or soft strategy choice. Accordingly，thispaper obtains the characteristics of the PPP project, provides effective renegotiation appeals, and improves solution mechanism ofrenegotiation. The results will provide theoretical basis for promoting the renegotiation of PPP projects and the progress of PPPprojects effectively.