非对称信息下考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链博弈模型

考查由1个生产商和1个零售商构成的两级绿色供应链系统，绿色产品的市场需求由产品价格和产品绿色度共同决定。假设消费者对绿色产品的偏好程度是非对称信息，生产商无法准确预测消费者的绿色偏好。构建3种不同情形下的博弈模型，得到3种情形下的批发价、产品绿色度、零售价、生产商利润和零售商利润的最优解。比较分析3种情形下最优解的不同变化，并分析消费者的绿色偏好程度对最优决策和利润产生的不同影响。

Game Model in Green Supply Chain Considering the Government Subsidy Mechanism under Asymmetric Information

A two-level green supply chain system which consists of one leader manufacturer and one follower retailer is considered. The market demand of green products mainly is impacted by the price and the product green degree level. Assuming that consumer's preference for green products is asymmetric information,the manufacturer cannot accurately predict consumer's green preference. Based on above analysis, game models are built under three different situations and the optimal solution is obtained for the wholesale price, product greenness, retailing price, manufacturer and retailer's profit under three different conditions. The different changes of the optimal solution are compared and analyzed under three different situations and the different impact of consumers' green preference on the optimal decision and profit analyzed. The result shows that (1) the government subsidy mechanism can not only greatly improve the green degree of products, but also increase the manufacturer and retailers' profit; (2) regardless of consumers' green preference, government subsidies for unit products are negatively correlated with the wholesale price of green products while positively correlated with the greenness level of green products; (3) when consumers' preference for green products is low, the profit of manufacturers in RG decision model is higher than that in MG decision model.