城镇供水企业效用优先的许可管制

利用纳什均衡及重复博弈的原理,讨论同一城市多家企业经营城市供水所引发的管网重复建设、资源浪费、无序价格竞争问题,研究管网正反馈因素对城市供水企业博弈结果的影响。阐明了当重复博弈实现合作均衡时,均衡分界点的动态变化趋势,并在减少重复建设等问题的前提下,给出了目前对发放经营许可证数量的政策建议。

Availability optimization-based regulatory license of urban water supply enterprises

The theories of Nash equilibrium and repeated games were used to evaluate the problems caused by the existence of more than one water supply enterprises in a city,such as reconstruction of pipe network,waste of resources and bad competition on price of city water supply.The influences of positive feedback of pipe network on the game result of the water supply enterprises were discussed.The dynamic variation tendency of equilibrium point of demarcation was clarified when the cooperative equilibrium was achieved by repeated games.Besides reducing the reconstruction,suggestions on the number of licenses of enterprises were made.