The implication of the philosophy of science for rational-emotive theory and therapy.

Suggests that rational-emotive therapy (RET) reflects specific philosophical positions, the most important of which is A. Ellis's (1962, 1979) position on epistemology. The notion of defining beliefs as rational or irrational and the primary clinical strategy in RET of disputing irrational beliefs demonstrates this epistemological emphasis. In disputing irrational beliefs, the therapist asks the client to question a specific irrational belief and the criteria for holding that belief. R. Wessler and R. Wessler's (1980) expanded RET model is reviewed, and a revised model involving constructual abilities and personal paradigms is proposed. A case example of a 53-yr-old White female with intense social anxiety illustrates the relationship between inferences, evaluations, and the personal paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)