Changes in outcomes in coalition bargaining.

Examined the results of earlier coalition experiments that concluded that the coalition with the largest payoff per member occurs most frequently and the reward division is close to an equal split (except for frequent deviations from equal share payoffs). The present authors hypothesized that inconsistencies in previous research were due to differences in experimental procedure and to Ss' familiarity with coalition games. In the present study, 240 male undergraduates played a 4-person multivalued apex game for 6 trials. Three games and 2 procedures were used. The 2 procedures differed in the number of rounds of offers and counteroffers required to form a coalition. As hypothesized, results indicate that deviations from equal shares increased over trials of the game and were greater with the procedure that required more rounds of bargaining. Findings regarding payoff divisions are in the direction predicted by the bargaining theory and equal excess model of coalition formation, but findings regarding frequencies of coalitions are contrary to the predictions of both theories. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)