|
|||||
|
|
| 建筑节能规制中的激励机制设计 | |
| 引用本文： | 李飞,刘宏伟. 建筑节能规制中的激励机制设计[J]. 江苏建筑, 2012, 0(2): 107-108,117 |
| 作者姓名： | 李飞 刘宏伟 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 盐城工学院,江苏盐城,224051 2. 盐城工学院,江苏盐城224051／河海大学工程项目管理研究所,江苏南京210098 |
| 基金项目： | 江苏省住房和城乡建设厅科学技术项目计划 |
| 摘 要： | 建筑节能规制设计必须考虑到建设业主的参与约束和激励相容约束。考虑到建筑节能的信息不对称性,建立不对称信息条件下的博弈模型,通过分析得出非信息对称条件下的最优机制不同于对称信息条件下的机制,从而说明设计激励机制的必要性。 |
| 关 键 词： | 建筑节能 规制设计 激励机制 博弈 |
Incentive Mechanism Design of Building Energy Efficiency Regulation |
|
| LI Fei,LIU Hong-wei. Incentive Mechanism Design of Building Energy Efficiency Regulation[J]. Jiangsu Construction, 2012, 0(2): 107-108,117 | |
| Authors: | LI Fei LIU Hong-wei |
| Affiliation: | 1,2(1.Yancheng Institute of Technology,Yancheng Jiangsu 224051 China; 2.Institute of Construction Project Management,Hohai University,Nanjing Jiangsu 210098 China) |
| Abstract: | Building energy regulation must be designed to take into account of the building owner’s participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint.The asymmetry of information about building energy should be considered,then the game model under asymmetric information can be established.This paper proved that optimal mechanism of non-symmetric information was different from the asymmetric information.According to the analysis of the paper,incentive mechanism is necessary for the government. |
| Keywords: | building energy efficiency regulation design incentive mechanism games theory |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |