| 非对称信息下城市生活用水水价机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 于洪涛,吴泽宁,郭瑞丽.非对称信息下城市生活用水水价机制[J].水利水电科技进展,2010,30(5):33-36. |
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| 作者姓名： | 于洪涛 吴泽宁 郭瑞丽 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 华北水利水电学院水利学院,河南,郑州,450011
2. 郑州大学水利与环境学院,河南,郑州,450002 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用信息经济学委托-代理理论,结合城市供水行业自然垄断性的特点,设计了一种激励相容的城市生活用水水价机制,将价格定在边际成本上,并对成本进行补贴。该机制不仅可以使供水企业如实申报经营成本,还有降低成本的激励作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 城市生活用水 水价 非对称信息 激励相容机制 |
| 修稿时间： | 2010/11/1 0:00:00 |
Water price mechanism of urban domestic water under asymmetric information |
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| YU Hong-tao,WU Ze-ning,GUO Rui-li.Water price mechanism of urban domestic water under asymmetric information[J].Advances in Science and Technology of Water Resources,2010,30(5):33-36. |
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| Authors: | YU Hong-tao WU Ze-ning GUO Rui-li |
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| Abstract: | By means of the principal-agent theory of information economics,according to the characteristics of natural monopoly of urban water supply industry,an incentive-compatible water price mechanism of urban domestic water based on marginal supply cost and exogenous subsidy was designed.This mechanism may lead to actual report of operating cost by water supply companies and has the incentive function in cost reduction. |
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| Keywords: | urban domestic water water price asymmetric information compatible incentive mechanism |
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