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不对称信息下输配电市场的管制策略研究
引用本文:王先甲,韩东,王广民,方德斌.不对称信息下输配电市场的管制策略研究[J].电网技术,2006,30(20):77-82.
作者姓名:王先甲  韩东  王广民  方德斌
作者单位:武汉大学,湖北省,武汉市,430072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金,国家社会科学基金
摘    要:首先建立了一套激励机制来揭示输配电企业的成本信息,然后通过与带有审核手段的激励机制模型下的监管手段进行对比,分析了不同管制策略的经济性问题,得出了对电力管制工作有指导意义的结论,即电力管制者应在信息租金和审核成本之间权衡,以保证电力管制工作的经济性。

关 键 词:NULL
文章编号:1000-3673(2006)20-0077-06
收稿时间:2006-05-25
修稿时间:2006年5月25日

Study on Regulation Strategies of Transmission and Distribution Markets under Asymmetric Information
WANG Xian-jia,HAN Dong,WANG Guang-min,FANG De-bin.Study on Regulation Strategies of Transmission and Distribution Markets under Asymmetric Information[J].Power System Technology,2006,30(20):77-82.
Authors:WANG Xian-jia  HAN Dong  WANG Guang-min  FANG De-bin
Affiliation:Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei Province, China
Abstract:Transmission and distribution markets of electricity industry have a strong attribute of natural monopoly,so the government should regulate them.Due to the asymmetric information between regulator and grid companies,it is difficult to examine and distinguish the cost information offered by grid companies,so some problems will bring about to the regulator in the regulation process.To solve this problem,at first a set of incentive mechanism to reveal the cost information of the grid companies is built;then by way of comparing with the regulation measures under incentive mechanism model with auditing,the economy of various regulation strategies is analyzed;finally,a conclusion,which is available to guide the regulation of transmission and distribution markets,is derived,i.e.,the regulator should trade off between the information rent and the cost of examination and verification to ensure the economy of the regulation in practice.
Keywords:electricity market  price regulation  incentive mechanism  information rent  auditing mechanism
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