Provable security of a pairing-free one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol for wireless sensor networks |
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Authors: | Rehana Yasmin Eike Ritter Guilin Wang |
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Affiliation: | 1. School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK 2. Huawei International Pte Ltd, 20 Science Park Road, Singapore, 117674, Singapore
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Abstract: | Designing efficient as well as secure cryptographic protocols for resource-constrained applications is a challenging task. In this paper, we formally analyze the security of an efficient one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol, the 1P-AKE protocol, which is primarily proposed for resource-constrained sensor nodes devices in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In contrast to the existing identity-based one-pass key establishment protocols, the 1P-AKE protocol does not require any bilinear pairing computation in order to establish a key. This feature makes it really attractive for resource-constrained application environments, such as WSNs, where pairing computations are too expensive. We show that in the random oracle model, the 1P-AKE protocol is a secure authenticated one-pass key establishment protocol under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. The performance of the 1P-AKE protocol is also discussed and compared with the existing relevant protocols. |
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