基于委托代理理论的 DB 模式道德风险治理研究

完善 DB 模式管理机制既满足国内建筑业转型升级的迫切需要，又保证了业主的利益诉求。分析 DB 模式内涵特点及内部关系，构建“委托—代理”模型阐明了工程总承包市场内“道德风险”存在机理以及业主对于总承包商提供激励和约束措施的必要性。通过对模型参数进行分析，提出引入因素激励函数、相对信息强度和监督函数来规范总承包商的行为，并给予制定合同奖励条款、加强市场环境建设和拓宽业主监督渠道等相应措施建议。

Moral Hazard Governance of Design-BuildMode Based on Principal-Agent Theory

Improving the management mechanism for DB mode not only meets the urgent needs of reforming of the constructionindustry，but also ensures the demands of owners. This paper analyzes the characteristics and internal relations of DB model，thenbuilds a principal-agent model to clarify the existence of moral hazard in project delivery market and the necessity of owners’incentive and constraint measurements for general contractors. According to the results, hierarchical incentive function，informationintensity, and supervisory function are proposed to improve the behavior of general contractors. This study also provides thecorresponding suggestions including using incentive provisions, improving market environment, and widening supervision methodsto reduce moral hazards in DB model.