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| 双边道德风险下创业投资双方投入及激励契约 | |
| 引用本文： | 蔡永清,曹国华,陈艳丽. 双边道德风险下创业投资双方投入及激励契约[J]. 工业工程, 2011, 14(3) |
| 作者姓名： | 蔡永清 曹国华 陈艳丽 |
| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(08BJY154); 教育部新世纪人才支持计划(NCET-07-0905) |
| 摘 要： | 运用现代契约经济学及信息经济学的基本理论,设计了在双边道德风险条件下创业投资家和创业企业家的线性激励契约。对完全信息下和不完全信息下双方的创业努力投入、资金投入及项目产出等进行了对比分析,并对模型求解,结果表明合约报酬结构对各要素激励作用的影响。通过一个数值算例进一步验证了分析结果,对于我国的创业投资实践具有一定的指导意义。 |
| 关 键 词： | 双边道德风险 创业投资 激励契约 |
Study on Venture Capital Input and the Incentive Contract with Bilateral Moral Hazard |
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| Cai Yong-qing,Cao Guo-hua,Chen Yan-li. Study on Venture Capital Input and the Incentive Contract with Bilateral Moral Hazard[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2011, 14(3) | |
| Authors: | Cai Yong-qing Cao Guo-hua Chen Yan-li |
| Affiliation: | Cai Yong-qing,Cao Guo-hua,Chen Yan-li (School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China) |
| Abstract: | Based on the theory of modern contract and information economics,a linear incentive contract between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur under bilateral moral hazard condition is designed. With this contract,the efforts and capital investment of both sides,and the output are analyzed with complete and incomplete information.By doing so,it presents how the sharing arrangement in the contract affects the incentive function for the input factors.A numerical example is given to verify the results obtain... |
| Keywords: | bilateral moral hazard venture capital incentive contract |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |