| 动态协商对策的诱导平衡* |
| |
| 引用本文： | 祝世京,戴建设,陈珽.动态协商对策的诱导平衡*[J].控制理论与应用,1997,14(2):249-253. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 祝世京 戴建设 陈珽 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 华中理工大学系统工程研究所!武汉，430074 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文动态对策协商的问题，提出了动态对策问题在协商 解处的诱导平衡的概念，研究了诱导平衡存在的必要条件和充分条件，并分析了线性二次型动态对策问题的诱导平衡。
|
| 关 键 词： | 动态对策 协商解 诱导平衡 自动控制理论 |
| 收稿时间： | 9/4/1995 12:00:00 AM |
| 修稿时间： | 7/8/1996 12:00:00 AM |
Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems |
| |
| ZHU Shijing,DAI Jianshe and CHEN Ting.Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems[J].Control Theory & Applications,1997,14(2):249-253. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHU Shijing DAI Jianshe and CHEN Ting |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the incentive methods of Stackelberg game,the dynamic bargaining game problems are considered and the concept of incentive equilibria about the bargaining solutions is proposed. A sufficient condition and a necessary condition concerning the existence of incentive equilibria are proposed. As an illustrative example,the incentive equilibria for linear-quadratic games are discussed. |
| |
| Keywords: | dynamic game bargaining solution incentive equilibria |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《控制理论与应用》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《控制理论与应用》下载全文 |
