| 毕业生应聘用人单位的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 单一峰,周念.毕业生应聘用人单位的博弈分析[J].宁波工程学院学报,2008,20(3):19-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 单一峰 周念 |
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| 作者单位： | 宁波大红鹰职业技术学院,浙江,宁波,315175 |
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| 摘 要： | 对目前大学毕业生与用人单位在应聘过程中是否应该选择包装的问题,通过建立毕业生应聘用人单位的博弈模型,从纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡的角度进行分析,给出毕业生就业应聘需要适度包装的理论基础。
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| 关 键 词： | 纯策略 混合策略 纳什均衡 |
Game Model oF Graduates and Employers |
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| SHAN Yi-feng,ZHOU Nian.Game Model oF Graduates and Employers[J].Journal of Ningbo University of Technology,2008,20(3):19-22. |
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| Authors: | SHAN Yi-feng ZHOU Nian |
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| Affiliation: | (Ningbo Dahongying Vocational Technical College, Ningbo, Zhejiang, 315175 ,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper,focusing on whether the college graduates and the employers should both be packaged in the job-hunting,attempts to construct the game model between graduates and employers,analyzes the issue from the pure and the mixed Nash equilibrium theory and concludes that the graduates shall be packaged properly. |
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| Keywords: | pure strategy mixed strategy Nash equilibrium |
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