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单供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型研究
引用本文:蔡建湖,黄卫来,程海芳.单供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型研究[J].工业工程与管理,2005,10(5):56-60.
作者姓名:蔡建湖  黄卫来  程海芳
作者单位:华中科技大学管理学院,湖北,武汉,430074;华中科技大学管理学院,湖北,武汉,430074;华中科技大学管理学院,湖北,武汉,430074
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70271027)
摘    要:在供应商管理用户库存(VMI)环境中,当面临的具体条件不同时,供应商和零售商的利润分配是不同的,论述了当一个供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型,此时供应商负责库存决策,他可以在各个销售点之间转运(Transshipment)库存.建立了供应商和零售商的一个Stackelberg博弈,零售商作为领导者是通过决定销售价格来体现的.结果显示最终供应商和零售商可以达到一个子博弈精练纳什均衡,零售商在该模式下获得了很大的利润份额.给出了一个算例计算了均衡时的库存量和销售价格.

关 键 词:供应链  VMI  Stackelberg博弈  转运
文章编号:1007-5429(2005)05-0056-05
收稿时间:2004-09-20
修稿时间:2005-01-15

Study of VMI Model When a Supplier Faces a Retailer Who Possesses of Several Retail Points
CAI Jian-hu,HUANG Wei-lai,CHENG Hai-fang.Study of VMI Model When a Supplier Faces a Retailer Who Possesses of Several Retail Points[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2005,10(5):56-60.
Authors:CAI Jian-hu  HUANG Wei-lai  CHENG Hai-fang
Abstract:In the case of vendor managed inventory(VMI),the profit allocation between a supplier and a retailer is different when conditions are different.A special VMI model is discussed when a supplier faces a retailer who possesses of several retail points,and the supplier can transship inventory between different retail points.The interaction between the supplier and the retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg game with complete information,where the retailer acts as a leader by setting the retail price.It is shown that Stackelberg-Nash equilibria exist in our dynamic game model.And the retailer obtains a great share of benefit from this mode.Our findings are illustrated by a numerical example at last.
Keywords:supply chain  VMI  Stackelberg game  transshipment
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