基于VMI供应商资金受限的供应链协调策略

研究随机需求下供应商资金受限的供应链协调问题，基于供应商管理库存（VMI）建立零售商-供应商Stackelberg博弈模型，分析库存补贴策略和零售商预付款策略对供应链绩效的影响，并比较两种策略的适用范围。结果表明，零售商可以通过库存补贴策略消除分散决策下双重边际效应导致的供应链绩效损失，同时提高供应商和零售商利润。相比于库存补贴，零售商预付款策略可以消除由供应商资金受限导致的供应链绩效损失，并减小部分由双重边际效应导致的供应链绩效损失，实现帕累托改进，提高供应链整体绩效。

VMI Supply Chain Coordination Strategy with Supplier’s Capital Constraint

The supply chain coordination strategy with the supplier’s capital constraint under stochastic demand is investigated and the retailer-supplier Stackelberg game model is established based on Vendor Managed Inventory（VMI）. The effect on the supply chain performance by inventory subsidy and retailer’s advance payment is analyzed respectively and the two strategies are compared. The results show that the inventory subsidy strategy can not only eliminate the reduction of the supply chain performance caused by double marginalization, but also improve the profit of both the supplier and retailer. Compared with the inventory subsidy strategy, retailer’s advance payment can decrease the reduction of the supply chain performance caused by capital constraint and double marginalization, achieving Pareto improvement to improve the supply chain performance.