Two moralities in action contexts: Relationships to thought, ego regulation, and development.

Six adolescent friendship groups (56 Ss aged 13–27 yrs), each group being sexually heterogeneous but all Black or White and all of lower or middle socioeconomic status, participated in moral games in an investigation of moral action constructed according to 2 different formulations. L. Kohlberg's (1969) theory of formal moral judgment, which is viewed as a process of deducing logical moral solutions from imperative rules, was contrasted with an interpersonal formulation that posits that moral solutions are achieved through dialogues that strive for balanced agreements among participants. Analyses focused on relationships between interview-based moral thought, action in the moral games, the coordination of action by coping and defensive processes used in these moral games, and changes in the level of thought after the game experiences. Although the levels of both the Kohlberg and interpersonal scores fluctuated between games, the interpersonal scores were more stable than the formal scores, particularly in stressful games. Black adolescents had higher interpersonal than formal levels; Whites reversed this pattern. All Ss used interpersonal more frequently than formal reasoning in the action situations. Predictions of action from test levels were markedly improved for the interpersonal moral scores when ego processing was taken into account. After the games the levels of both moral scores increased for the 6 experimental groups as compared to a control group of an additional 17 teenagers. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)