| 激励供应商R&D努力的最优补贴策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 彭鸿广,骆建文.激励供应商R&D努力的最优补贴策略研究[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(5):41-47. |
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| 作者姓名： | 彭鸿广 骆建文 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052;浙江科技学院经济管理学院,浙江杭州310023
2. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001023); 教育部人文社科基金青年项目(09YJC630208); 上海市科技发展基金软科学研究博士生学位论文资助计划(11692190900) |
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| 摘 要： | 构建了一个由两个竞争的供应商、一个采购商和最终消费者组成的供应链模型,采购商通过招标方式向供应商采购物品,供应商的R&D活动可以降低自己的制造成本.分别考虑了对供应商总额补贴、对供应商单位补贴和对消费者单位补贴三种不同情形下,政府R&D补贴对供应商的R&D努力和社会福利的影响.研究发现,对供应商的总额补贴并不能激励供应...
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 招标机制 R&D努力 政府补贴 |
Optimal Subsidy Strategy to Motivate Suppliers' R&D Effort |
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| PENG Hong-guang,LUO Jian-wen.Optimal Subsidy Strategy to Motivate Suppliers' R&D Effort[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2011,16(5):41-47. |
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| Authors: | PENG Hong-guang LUO Jian-wen |
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| Affiliation: | PENG Hong-guang1,2,LUO Jian-wen1(1.Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai JiaoTong University,Shanghai 200052,China,2.School of Economics & Management,Zhejiang University of Science and Technology,Zhejiang,Hangzhou 310023,China) |
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| Abstract: | A supply chain model composed of two competitive suppliers,a monopolist buyer and consumers is set up,in which the buyer procures from suppliers by tendering mechanism,suppliers' R&D can cut down their production cost.Supplier's R&D effort and social welfare are respectively investigated in lump-sum subsidy to supplier,unit subsidy to supplier and unit subsidy to consumers.Research shows that lump-sum subsidy to supplier can't motivate suppliers' R&D effort and improve social welfare at all.Unit subsidy to ... |
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| Keywords: | supply chain tender mechanism R&D effort social welfare |
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