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水市场的博弈分析
引用本文:孔珂,解建仓,岳新利,陈鸿起.水市场的博弈分析[J].水利学报,2005,36(4):0491-0495.
作者姓名:孔珂  解建仓  岳新利  陈鸿起
作者单位:西安理工大学,水利水电学院,陕西,西安,710048
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助(50279041),国家"863"计划研究资助项目(2002AA113150)
摘    要:本文应用博弈论研究了水资源管理部门如何利用初始水权分配和水资源费对水市场进行有效的宏观调控,以实现水资源的优化配置。分析了市场经济条件下以水权和水市场为基础的水资源配置的过程。根据用水者在水市场上的行为特征,建立了以水资源总效益最大化为目标的两阶段动态博弈模型。给出了求解子博弈精炼纳什均衡条件下市场参与者的行动策略方法,从而得出管理机构相应的最优初始水权分配方案和水资源费率方案,并用算例阐明了建模的思路与方法。

关 键 词:水权  水市场  分配  动态博弈  纳什均衡
文章编号:0559-9350(2005)04-0491-05
修稿时间:2003年12月31

Game analysis of water resources market
KONG Ke,XIE Jian-cang,YUE Xin-li,CHEN Hong-qi.Game analysis of water resources market[J].Journal of Hydraulic Engineering,2005,36(4):0491-0495.
Authors:KONG Ke  XIE Jian-cang  YUE Xin-li  CHEN Hong-qi
Affiliation:Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China
Abstract:The games theory is applied to analyze the effectiveness of government organization in macroscopically controlling the water market in order to optimize the water resources allocation by utilizing the initial water rights allocation and water resources rate. The procedure of water resources deploment based on water rights and water market under the condition of market-oriental economy is analyzed. A two-stage dynamic game model regarding the most optimal income as the target is established according to the behavior characteristics of water users. The method for solving the market behavior strategies of water users in case of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is studied. On this basis, the optimal scheme of initial water rights allocation and water resources rate can be deduced consequently. An example is given to illustrate the idea of constructing and solving the model.
Keywords:water rights  water resources market  allocation  dynamic game  Nash equilibrium
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