博弈论模型在解决水资源冲突上的运用

水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。与这两个问题有关的水资源管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。这些利益相关者因为不同的兴趣和利益常常发生冲突。在缺乏水市场和专有财产权利时, 冲突是不可避免的。博弈论是模仿和解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。以汉江流域水资源管理中所涉及的不同利益相关者的冲突为例，展示如何用非合作与合作博弈来模拟和解决水资源冲突。在本研究中，统计学和经济计量学的回归模型法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数，成本效益分析法来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。博弈模拟结果显示,非合作虽然可使某方赢利，但却使整体受损;相反，合作虽然可给某方带来损失，但是却给各方带来整体利益。所以，如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方，以补足损失方的损失，博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅可使水资源不同利益相关者受益，而且在水资源合理分配﹑水价制定﹑生态补偿等方面也可以为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。

Solving water conflicts using game theoretic models

Water quality degradation and water scarcity are two serious problems in developing countries. Water management related to these problems usually involves multi-stakeholders with contradictory interests. In the absence of market and exclusive property rights, conflicts among those multi-stakeholders are unavoidable. Game theory can be an appropriate approach to simulate and resolve such conflicts. In this paper, the conflicts of multiple water stakeholders involved in water management of the Hanjiang River Basin in China are modelled as non-cooperative and cooperative games. Statistical and econometric regression models are used to formulate the payoff functions of different players. Cost - benefit analysis (CBA) and the demand-supply principle ( DSP) are applied to compare the game outcomes. The results of the game simulations show that cooperation can make all the players better off, although some players may be worse off before the benefit is shared among the players by side payment. The results are not only a comparison of the different water stakeholders, but also benefit water administration for decision support on water distribution, water pricing and ecological compensation, etc.