不同水权模式下流域水资源配置博弈的一般性解释

文中运用博弈论中的经典分析案例结合流域水资源配置特点对不同水权模式下参与人的用水行为作出合理解释。分析表明,在公共水权模式下,由于个体理性以及水资源负外部性的存在,容易使水资源利用产生“公有地悲剧”的结果。同时证明,在缺乏排他性水权或水权制度设计不尽完善的情况下,流域水资源不仅可能被过度利用,而且全流域社会福利将不能达到最优。上游用水主体因具备先动优势而恣意用水,由此给下游用水主体带来利益损害。在个体理性的作用下,试图通过全局优化实现流域水资源配置的帕雷托改进是无法实现的。

A general explanation of water resources allocation on river basin level under different water right modes with game theory

Based on some classical analyzing cases made with the game theory,the behaviors of the water users participating the water allocation concerned under different water right modes are explained rationally herein combined with the characteristics of the water resources allocation on river basin level.The analysis shows that the so-called "tragedy of the commons" is to be occurred in the utilization of water resources as the individual rationality and negative externality of water resources are there under the public water right mode.Simultaneously,it is proved that not only the water resources in a river basin is to be overused,but also the social welfare for the whole basin concerned is not to be optimized under the condition of the water right short of exclusivity or the water right system designed imperfectly.Under this circumstance,the water user situated on the upper reach of a river possess the first-mover advantage and then can use the water immoderately,as a result,the benefit of the lower reach water user will be damaged.Therefore,it is impossible to realize the optimization of the whole basin's water resources allocation with Pareto improvement under the effect of the individual rationality.