基于复制动态的食品安全监管演化博弈分析

食品安全问题是当前民众关注的焦点之一,它关系到我国的国计民生。近年来食品安全问题不断出现,这对于食品企业提出了更高的要求,对政府监察机构加大了压力。运用演化博弈论的方法,建立政府监察机构与食品企业对食品安全行为的进化博弈模型,对该条件下食品安全行为的稳定状态进行分析。讨论政府监察机构与食品企业在相互作用的过程中决策的选择,并提出关于食品安全的保障建议。

Evolutionary Game Aanalysis of Food Safety Administration Based on Duplicative Dynamic

Currently food safety is one of the focuses concerned by the nation, it affectS the people＇s livelihood of our country. The troubles of food safety are happened frequently in recent years, so it raises the request about the food enterprises and increase the pressure about the supervision department. By using evolutionary game, the model about the supervision behave of food safe organization between the food enterprises and the supervision department is set up and the steady-state under this condition is analysed. At the same time, the decisions between the food enterprises and the supervision department are discussed and some suggestions about the security of food are given.