排污权交易实施后的寡头垄断电力市场的均衡分析

近年来,温室气体对全球气温变暖的影响已成为众多国家尤其是发达国家关注的重要问题。排污权交易是减轻温室气体排放的一个有效途径。电力工业是排放温室气体最多的行业,排污权交易的实施肯定会对电力行业的发展和电力市场的运营产生重要的影响。基于这样的背景,在传统的古诺(Cournot)非合作博弈模型的框架下,研究了排污权交易实施后,在完全信息与不完全信息情况下寡头垄断电力市场的古诺均衡状态。假设各发电公司在排污权市场均为价格接受者,而在电力市场采用策略性的报价以最大化利润。排污权的再分配由减排效率高的发电公司流向减排效率低的发电公司。最后以有6家发电公司参与的电力市场为例验证了模型的正确性,并分析了排污权交易的引入对寡头垄断电力市场均衡电量的影响。

Investigation on the equilibrium states of oligopoly electricity markets after the implementation of emission trading

The climate change and further global warming has become a problem of extensive concern especially in developed countries in recent years.Emission trading is widely deemed as an efficient way to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases.The power industry is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in many countries,and hence the implementation of the emission trading will certainly have significant impacts on the development of the power industry and the operation of electricity markets.Given this background,within the methodological framework of the well-developed Cournot non-cooperative gaming model,for the situation with the emission trading the Coumot equilibrium states are investigated for an oligopoly electricity market under complete and incomplete information.In the emission trading market,the emission permits allocated to those highly efficient generation companies(units) with lower emissions could be traded to other companies with higher emissions.It is assumed that the generation companies behave as price takers in the emission trading market while they act strategically in the electricity market.A numerical example with six power companies is employed to demonstrate the features of the developed model as well as to analyze the impacts of the emission trading on the oligopoly electricity market equilibriums.This work is jointly supported by Speciam Fund of the National Basic Research Program of China(No.2004CB217905),and National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70673023).