基于多群体协同进化的电力市场均衡模型

可再生能源配额制及绿证制度作为一种新型的市场交易政策,能够极大地促进新能源的消纳。考虑配额制及绿证制度引入后,电力批发市场和绿证交易市场存在耦合的影响关系,市场中发电商存在相互博弈行为。基于电力市场均衡策略,建立了两个市场协同下的多寡头非合作博弈模型。在电力批发市场中,发电商以古诺形式参与市场竞争。在绿证市场中,绿电商以供给函数形式进行绿证竞争。针对博弈模型,采用多群体协同进化算法对纳什均衡点进行求解,重点对两种市场交互下的发电商策略性行为进行分析。仿真结果表明了模型的有效性及算法的可行性。

Equilibrium model of electricity market based on multi-swarm co-evolution

As a kind of new market trading policy, Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and Tradable Green Certification (TGC) can greatly promote the consumption of renewable energy. Considering the introduction of RPS and TGC, there is a coupling relationship between the wholesale electricity market and the green certificate market, and there are game behaviors among the power producers in the market. Based on the equilibrium strategy of the electricity market, a multi-oligarch non-cooperative game model under the coordination of two markets is established. In the wholesale electricity market, power suppliers participate in market competition in the form of the Cournot model. In the green certificate market, renewable firms compete in the form of a supply function model. For the game model, the Nash equilibrium is solved by a multi-swarm co-evolutionary algorithm, and the strategic behavior of power suppliers under the interaction of two markets is analyzed. The results of simulation show the validity of the model and the feasibility of the algorithm. This work is supported by Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 2018py11).