Analysis of a monthly auction for financial transmission rights and flow-gate rights |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Box 55665, 102 15 Stockholm, Sweden;2. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, UK;3. Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK;1. Yale University, United States;2. New York University, United States;1. School of Humanities and Economic Management, China University of Geosciences, Beijing 100083, China;2. Key Laboratory of Carrying Capacity Assessment for Resource and Environment, Ministry of Land and Resources, Beijing 100083, China;3. Department of Energy and Mineral Engineering in the College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, The Pennsylvania State University, PA 16802, USA;4. Open Lab of Talents Evaluation, Ministry of Land and Resources, Beijing 100083, China;1. School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Zhu Xin Zhuang, Bei Nong Road No. 2, Changping District, Beijing 102206, China;2. China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd., Jin Rong Street No. 19, Xicheng District, Beijing 100032, China;3. Ganshu Electric Power Corporation, Lanzhou 730050, China |
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| Abstract: | A monthly transmission rights (TR) auction issuing both point-to-point financial transmission rights (FTRs) and flow-gate rights (FGRs) is studied in this paper. Initially, a locational marginal pricing (LMP) based energy market is presented, in which the linear security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) problem is solved for each hour of system operation, determining the nodal prices, the transmission link capacity prices and the transmission congestion charges (TCCs) that should be collected by the ISO in case of congestion. A monthly auction is conducted in the TR market issuing FTR obligations, FTR options and FGRs to market players, building a link between all types of transmission rights under the same market structure. Combining the advantages of financial and physical rights, the market efficiency can be enhanced by offering a variety of choices for risk management to market players. The monthly TR auction is tested on several case studies using the IEEE three-area RTS96 and useful conclusions are drawn concerning the utility of the various types of transmission rights as compared to one another, in terms of the reimbursement they provide to their holders. |
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