可中断负荷管理激励机制的设计

可中断负荷管理（ILM）是供电公司在用电高峰时段为减缓电力供需紧张而实行的一种需求侧管理方法。在电力市场条件下设计了实施可中断负荷的激励机制，以克服因为信息不对称导致供电公司负荷调节能力下降、过多支付用户的中断赔偿等问题。引入信息经济学里的委托-代理理论，使得机制具有激励相容特性，激励用户上报真实的中断成本，从而优化供电公司的负荷分配、减少中断补偿。算例分析和仿真证明了陔机制设计的有效性。

Incentive mechanism design for interruptible load management

Interruptible load management(ILM) is a DSM measure for electric power supply company during peak power consumption.Under electric power market condition,an incentive mechanism is designed to overcome problems because of information unsymmetrical between power supply company and industrial customers,like the ability of load accommodation declined or overpaid the industrial customers for interruptible load compensation.The principal-agent theory is used in the mechanism design to make the mechanism incentive and compatible and incent the customers to reveal their interruptible utility voluntarily.So electric power supply companies can afford to optimize the load distribution and cut the interruptible compensation cost.The validity of the mechanism is demonstrated by showing the example analysis.