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考虑成本与收益摊配的电力需求响应博弈模型
引用本文:吴英俊,刘成骏,林智威,施展宇,李琥,吴晨.考虑成本与收益摊配的电力需求响应博弈模型[J].电力建设,2021,42(6):135-144.
作者姓名:吴英俊  刘成骏  林智威  施展宇  李琥  吴晨
作者单位:河海大学能源与电气学院,南京市211100;国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,南京市210008
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(B210202073)
摘    要:随着综合能源系统的发展,需求响应技术作为释放系统潜力的重要手段受到了越来越广泛的关注。文章提出了一种综合能源系统中的电力需求响应机制。首先,针对电力需求响应过程中存在的3个主体:电力系统运营商(grid operator,GO)、电力需求响应聚合商(electric response coordinator,ERC)、综合能源用户(integrated energy user,IEU)提出了一种交易架构;其次,以各主体运行经济性最优,基于博弈论构建了三主体交易模型;而后,提出了由于GO参与电力需求响应带来的可靠性提升等价经济收益在GO和ERC之间的收益分配方法,以及IEU参与电力需求响应带来的用电满意度下降等价经济成本在IEU和ERC间的成本分摊方法;最后,基于目标分析级联法(analytical target cascading, ATC)原理和NSGA算法对所提出的模型进行优化和求解,通过算例仿真证明了模型的有效性和合理性。

关 键 词:综合能源系统  多主体  交易机制  多能优化
收稿时间:2020-10-20

Game Model of Electric Demand Response Considering Benefit Sharing and Cost Allocation
WU Yingjun,LIU Chengjun,LIN Zhiwei,SHI Zhanyu,LI Hu,WU Chen.Game Model of Electric Demand Response Considering Benefit Sharing and Cost Allocation[J].Electric Power Construction,2021,42(6):135-144.
Authors:WU Yingjun  LIU Chengjun  LIN Zhiwei  SHI Zhanyu  LI Hu  WU Chen
Affiliation:1. College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China2. Economic Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Nanjing 210008, China
Abstract:With the development of integrated energy system (IES), electric demand response has received widespread concentration as a method for releasing the potential of distribution network (DN). This paper proposes an EDR mechanism under IES. Firstly, a transaction framework is proposed for three stakeholders in the EDR: grid operator (GO), electric response coordinator (ERC), and integrated energy user (IEU). Then, in order to maximize the reliability improvement benefit of the DN, maximize the economic benefit for ERC, maximize IEU satisfaction and minimize the cost of energy consumption, a tri-stakeholder transaction model based on game theory is founded. Next, a benefit sharing means of equaling economic benefit from reliability improvement between GO and ERCs, and a cost allocation of equaling economic cost from electricity consumption decline between ERC and IEUs is established, which is caused by GO and IEUs participation in EDR. Finally, a method of optimization and solution for the proposed model based on the ACT theory and NSGA algorithm is presented, and case simulation demonstrates the validity and reasonableness of the proposed model.
Keywords:integrated energy system                                                                                                                        multi-stakeholder                                                                                                                        trade mechanism                                                                                                                        multi-energy optimization
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