计及联盟内部博弈的负荷聚集商优化运营策略

考虑到作为“联盟组织者”的负荷聚集商与作为“联盟成员”的用户间的博弈关系直接影响联盟整体对外竞价及盈利能力,文章以负荷聚集商参与调峰市场为场景,基于纳什讨价还价理论,对负荷调峰效果、负荷聚集商出清能力等因素进行量化并作为不同博弈主体的谈判筹码,建立了负荷聚集商与各类型用户体之间的收益分配模型,并依据用户对调峰电价与电量的不同态度,构建了用户满意度指标。算例仿真结果表明:所提模型能够保证联盟稳固同时增加联盟整体收益,且能合理有效地对主体收益进行分配;制定浮动电价策略能够对用户需求响应形成正向激励,同时提高合作双方的收益。整体与个体的双赢结果验证了所提方法的合理性与优越性。

Optimizing Operation Strategy for Load Aggregator Considering the Internal Game in the Alliance

Considering that the game relationship between load aggregators as the organizers and users as the members of the alliance directly affects the overall external bidding and profitability of the alliance, this paper takes the scenario of load aggregator’s participation in the peak-shaving market, factors such as load peak regulation effect and load aggregator’s clearing ability are quantified and used as bargaining chips for different game subjects based on Nash’s bargaining theory. A revenue distribution model between load aggregators and various types of users is established. According to the different attitudes of peak electricity price and electricity, the user satisfaction index is constructed. The simulation results of the numerical example show that the proposed model can ensure the stability of the alliance and increase the overall income of the alliance, and can reasonably and effectively distribute the income of the main bodies. The strategy of formulating a floating electricity price can form positive incentives for user demand response and improve the income of both parties. The overall and individual win-win results verify the rationality and superiority of the method proposed in this paper.