基于静态非合作博弈的电动汽车充电电价影响因素量化分析

电动汽车的大规模推广应用需要合理地制定充电电价,运用博弈论分析了电动汽车发展相关的主要三方——政府、充电设施运营商和用户的利益关系,构建了关于充电电价和电动汽车发展规模的三方博弈模型,并针对静态非合作博弈方式进行了博弈求解。以珠三角9个城市电动汽车数据为例,得到了分别以充电设施运营商和政府为博弈主导方的博弈均衡解,在此基础上定量分析了5个影响因素变动幅度改变的条件下,充电电价和电动汽车保有量的变化趋势,以及各影响因素对充电电价和电动汽车保有量的敏感程度。最后在政府给予充电设施运营商适当补贴的情况下得到双方可接受的博弈均衡解,并对用户的广义成本进行分析,合理的充电定价能够满足三方的利益诉求,有利于电动汽车的大规模推广。

Quantitative Analysis of Influence Factors about EV’ s Charging Electricity Price Based on the Static Non-Cooperative Game Theory

The forthcoming mass popularization and application of electric vehicles(EVs)would prompt the urgent requirement of reasonable charging electricity price. Game theory is used to analyze the interests relationship of the main three players to the EV’ s development including the government, the charging infrastructure operator and the users. Then, the tripartite game model about the charging electricity price and holdings of EVs is built and gets classical solution on the basis of static non-cooperative game. Focusing on EV’ s data of nine cities in the Pearl River Delta, the game equilibrium solutions are obtained based on charging infrastructure operator or the government as the leading party respectively. Moreover, the variations of charging electricity price, EVs holdings and the sensitive degree of five influence factors are quantitatively calculated. Ultimately considering the acquired appropriate subsidies of charging infrastructure for the operator offered by government, the accepted game equilibrium solution for both players is produced and the generalized cost of the user is analyzed, which can satisfy the interests of three players. It is beneficial to large-scale proliferation of EVs.