考虑电力合约的激励性市场机制设计

电力市场中无论是统一竞价机制还是按报价支付机制都难于激励发电商报真实成本,其策略性报价危及电力系统的安全和经济运行.该文以机制设计理论为基础,设计了一种考虑电力合约的激励性机制.该机制在实现经济调度的同时能有效的激励发电机组上报真实成本,从而引导发电容量投资,实现社会资源的合理配置.算例分析表明,所设计的机制对边际、边际附近或以上机组的激励更为有效,既能保证各机组合理回收容量成本又能抑制其暴利行为.

THE MECHANISM DESIGN TO ELECTRICITY MARKETS CONSIDERING CONTRACT

In electricity market, it is very difficult to inspirit the generation companies to bid the true cost with either the uniform price auction or pay-as-bid auction. The tactful pricing of generation companies will be harmful to the security and economical operation of power system. Based on the mechanism design theory, an incentive mechanism considering contract was put forward in this paper. The mechanism is able to inspirit the generation companies to bid the true cost effectively and carry out economical operation as well. Then it can attract the generation capacity investment and configure the social resource reasonably. The illustration demonstrates the new mechanism can more effectively inspirit the generation companies on, near or over the system marginal cost, and it is able to ensure reasonable capacity cost recovery and restrain the sudden huge profits of all generation companies.