合理回收容量成本的激励性电力竞价机制的建模研究

电力市场中管理者和发电商之间的信息不对称会引发发电商的策略性报价，这会危及系统的安全和经济运行。该文基于机制设计理论，提出了一种具有激励相容特性的电力竞价机制。该机制能引导发电商披露真实信息，从而实现经济调度，还能根据报价信息评定机组的容量成本，引导发电容量投资。此外，新机制的电价反映出负荷变动的趋势，能激励发电商积极响应负荷的变化，增强了系统安全性。算例采用蒙特卡罗方法，其结果证实了新机制的良好特性。

RESEARCH ON MODELING THE INCENTIVE ELECTRICITY BIDDING MECHNISM OF RESONABLE CAPACITY COST RECOVERY

In an electricity market, an asymmetry of information from both market manager and generation company will cause some tactful pricing which will be harmful to a safe and economical operation of the market system. This paper puts forward a new bidding mechanism characterized by impetus which is able to lead the generation company to publish its true information, and therefore, an economic dispatching can be carried out, moreover, it can evaluate the capacity cost of the generating unit and to attract investments for the generation capacity. In addition, the new mechanism can reflect the tendency of load variation and encourage the firms to respond it, and increase safety of the system. The illustration using Monte Carlo demonstrates the merits of the mechanism.