联营电力市场的博弈分析:单时段情形

该文介绍一种用于分析联营电力市场(Pool-based eloctricity market)中竞标行为的博弈模型。此文考虑单时段情形因而所建立的模型适合于实时市场，研究的对象是在纯策略意义下的Nash均衡点。首先，运用多值函数的不动点定理建立了一个均衡点的存在性引理。随后刻划了在发电容量相对紧张情况下的均衡点。然后，给出了在某种市场条件下博弈均衡点不存在的例子。为了提高博弈模型的预测能力，文中定义了一种较弱形式的均衡点概念即准均衡点。该文刻划了在发电容量相对充裕情况下的均衡点。文中所建立的模型可以用来进一步说明作者以前提出的一种市场力指标。

AUCTION GAMES IN POOL-BASED ELECTRICITY MARKETS:SINGLE-PERIOD CASE

The single-period auction game model for analyzing strategic behavior in pool-based electricity markets is presented. The focus of the study is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategy sense. The equilibrium existence under a rather restrictive condition is proved. The characterization of equilibriums under tight capacity constraints is provided. It is demonstrated that the auction game does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under a wide range of market conditions. to enhance the prediction power of the auction game model equilibrium, the quasi-equilibrium, is introduced. A weaker form of the characterization of the quasi-equilibrium under weak capacity constraints is provided.